In this paper, we use an unusually rich data set from Ghana to explore the endogenous formation of information network linkages among farmers. We propose and test a new measure of social distance that accommodates possible asymmetries in social distance. Using this improved measure, we show that social distance plays a major role in shaping network structure, but that other factors related to the inherent costs and benefits of linkage matter significantly as well. Network interlinkages appear relatively modest. We are also able to corroborate the sociological "strength of weak ties" hypothesis.
Introduction
The idea that social interactions influence individual decisions by means other than the impersonal play of the market has made its way into economics, typically through the discussion of how membership in some group (through peer or neighborhood effects, moral norms and the like) affects individual decision (see, for example, the discussion in Durlauf (1999) or Manski (2000) ).
Since the intersection of such affiliations defines one's identity (Breiger, 1990) this is an explanation that, under a different light, gained relevance in the economics literature with the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) . The concept of social distance (Akerlof, 1997) and the tendency to deal with those who are similar to us (homophily) ties both approaches, by feeding back into how groups are formed and maintained.
Most of the extant literature nonetheless takes social interactions as exogenous.
As Arrow (2000) puts it, in perhaps the clearest defense of such position, " [t] he concept of measuring social interactions may be a snare and a delusion. Instead of thinking of more and less, it may be more fruitful to think of the existing social relations as a preexisting network into which new parts of the economy (…) have to be fitted". Such an approach, however, moves from an under-socialized perspective of human agency that so many criticize in economics, to an over-socialized one (Granovetter, 1985) that economists typically associate with other social sciences. The nonrandomness of individuals' group memberships makes inference problematic.
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This reaction is not only inconsistent with the core economic principle that people respond to material self-interest, albeit not to material self-interest exclusively, it is also 1 Manski (1993) emphasizes three problems in particular: the reflection problem, the problem of omitted variables, and the endogenous nature of social networks. This paper focuses on the latter problem.
role such relations played as part of a safety net to be mobilized in times of stress: "the gift of a head of stock was not an impulsive action but was rather both given and received as a compliment calculated to extend and individual's sphere of supportive relationships.
Although unable to garner support in political matters or settlement of disputes from those friends who lived in neighboring societies, as would be the case with partners from within his own society, a herdsman's inter-societal partnerships greatly enlarged his knowledge of the region and his options in the economic sphere … when confronted with the risks and perils brought on by natural or men made disasters, such as droughts, disease and raids, the herdsmen could turn to his bond partners in addition to his kin and affines. When the difficulties of his intra-society coincided with his own, the individual who had invested in partnerships beyond the bounds of his own society continued to have options of assistance open to him." (p. 135-136) .
The common thread of these and many other anthropological, historical and sociological accounts is the focus on a set of links between agents (a social network) that are purposefully chosen by the individuals involved . As Wellman and Berkowitz (1988a) put it, "social networks are the strings that simultaneously constrain our freedom and provide us with opportunities to take initiatives" (p. xii). The appeal of explicitly incorporating the role of human agency in the design and evolution of observable networks of human relations is that, again quoting Wellman and Berkowitz "[i] t immediately directs analysts to look at linked social relations, and frees them from thinking of social systems as collections of individuals, two-person dyads, bounded groups or simple categories" (idem, 1988b, p.4) .
A small but growing empirical literature in development economics 3 addresses this issue of endogenous network formation relying heavily on the concept of social distance (Akerlof, 1997) and the tendency people have to deal more with those who are similar to us (homophily), rather than those who are different from us (heterophily). For example, Dercon and deWeerdt (2002) test for risk-insurance using data on the complete set of personal networks in a Tanzanian village while deWeerdt (forthcoming) explains the process by which these networks form. In a similar spirit, Conley and Udry (2002) study the process of learning about fertilizer application in Ghana while Udry and Conley (forthcoming) , address the question of the formation of the networks that shape the access to information, credit, land and labor in that same region. 4 This paper breaks from the literature in the way that we conceptualize social distance. In the economics literature to date, distance has been measured simply as a Euclidean norm to capture the magnitude of differences in any of several observable characteristics between network partners, with the most commonly used characteristic being physical location. Geographic distance has thus been the primary measure used.
We employ a simple modification that allows for the possibility that the direction (or sign) of these differences also matters, that one's ordinal position with respect to a potential network partner can affect culturally defined norms of behavior and one's subjective evaluation of the benefits of establishing or maintaining a social link.
3 With this choice, we miss the theoretical literature on models of network formation (see Jackson (forthcoming) for a review) and the (mostly US-based) literature on neighborhood effects, especially upon education outcomes (see Akerlof and Kranton (2003) for a review). Although both of those literatures provide some insights into this problem, space limitations prevent us from addressing them. 4 To this list, one could add Fafchamps and Lund (2003) , that study risk-sharing networks in the Philippines and Behrman, Kohler and Watkins (2001) , that analyze the diffusion of family planning and AIDS worries in Kenya. Although with similar objectives, their approach to the endogenous nature of such networks makes no use of the concept of social distance and, as such, is quite apart from the discussion in this paper.
In the next section, we briefly discuss the data we use. These publicly available data were collected in the Eastern Region of Ghana by Chris Udry and Markus Goldstein and have been used by them and their collaborators in several important recent papers on the role social networks play in rural Africa. Section 3 then presents our econometric results, which support three major conclusions. First, both material interest and sociocultural identity help explain individuals' decision to contact an acquaintance to obtain information relevant for the solution of specific agricultural production or marketing problems. Second, we test the measure of social distance proposed in Section 2 against the standard, Euclidean norm approach and find that the former outperforms the latter in explaining three of the four networks we study and is statistically equivalent in the fourth. Third, we find that frequency of contact has an inverted-U effect on the probability of contacting someone for information, giving some support to the "strength of weak ties hypothesis" suggested by Granovetter (1973) .
Data
We use data on economic activities and social interactions between people living in four villages in southeastern Ghana. The publicly available data 5 are discussed at length in Goldstein and Udry (1999) .
This region has a long tradition of commercial agriculture and, in the early 1990s, initiated a process of conversion from cassava and maize production, directed towards domestic urban consumer markets, into pineapple production, directed to European export markets. The transition in crops and markets brought with it new inputs (primarily, 7 inorganic fertilizers) and a process of differentiation between those farmers who adopted the new crop (mainly, male and wealthier farmers) and those who did not. Udry and Conley (forthcoming, p. 3) summarize this dynamic by saying that "economic development in this region is being shaped by the networks of information, capital and influence that permeate these communities." They are able to quantify the importance of social networks -for example, in learning about fertilizer application (Conley and Udry (2002) -because the survey collected very detailed data on respondents' patterns of personal interaction. We use those data to study endogenous network formation among these Ghanaian farmers.
Social networks information was collected in two ways. First, respondents were asked to identify those with whom they had significant discussions on agricultural matters. Second, respondents were matched with seven individuals randomly chosen from the sample 6 and asked about the possibility of addressing them when faced with some specific problem, through the following questions:
"Could you go to ___ if you had a problem with unhealthy crops?" "Could you go to ___ for advice about when to apply a new kind of fertilizer?" "Could you go to ___ if you wanted to discuss changing your method of planting?" "Could you go to ___ if you wanted to find a buyer for any of your crops?"
We use the answers to these questions to indicate the possibility of a link between the two individuals, i.e., the answers reflect the potential network of each respondent, not 6 The respondents were also non-randomly matched with three individuals considered to be focal in their village (a farmer in the survey and two other persons not previously surveyed). We do not use data on those three prospective matches, both due to its non-random nature and the fact that information is generally not available on most of the focal individuals, making the sort of analysis we perform impossible.
the actual one. Given that we care about the determinants of these networks (and not their actual benefits), this does not seem to be a limitation 7 . There were three possible answers, "yes", "no" and "yes, but he wouldn't know", although the last choice was never reported. Table 1 presents the answers to these questions, disaggregated by whether or not the respondent knows his or her match.
[ plainly a necessary condition to obtaining information through informal channels. Third, knowing someone does not mean that one can or would go to them to ask for information. Combining the second and third points, prior knowledge of someone is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to approach them for information. Thus the shape of the network through which rural Ghanaian farmers obtain information is plainly social yet determined by factors other than just prior association. 7 The other source of information on network structure in this data set, the question on with whom did the respondents' had significant discussions on agricultural matters, does not provide a better guide, for two reasons. First, not all the listed individuals were part of the sample, hence no information on their identity is available. Second, the period when each of the listed individuals was contacted is not known (making impossible the estimation of differences in characteristics that change over time, such as experience or wealth). One other possibility could be to use the answers to the question "Have you ever gone to X for advice about your farm?", where X is one of the random matches. This possibility poses similar problems to the one just described, to which one may add that a negative answer may just indicate that there were some other source of information that the respondent valued more and on which we may not have any information (including its existence). This may account for the small number of positive answers (around 10% of the total number of matches), which adds the additional problem that with such an imbalance in the structure of the dependent variable, the estimates of the parameters of a probit model, like the ones that will be estimated, become quite unreliable.
In order to explain the decisions summarized in with different crops, 9 sources of income other than farm production (non-farm wage or salaried employment and self-employment) and occupation. We take these variables as indicators of the costs and benefits of establishing the information link, both as attributes of the respondent and as measures of distance between the respondent and the match.
In the literature on social distance, the Euclidean norm appears to be the only measure used. Implicitly, its use imposes symmetry on the effect of differences between the two parties to a link. For example, taking wealth as the relevant dimension, the use of Euclidean distance assumes that wealth ordering is irrelevant to the incentives to establish a link, that a rich farmer faces the same costs and benefits of linking to a poor farmer as the same poor farmer does to the same richer man.
In order to avoid such an unnecessarily restrictive assumption, we measure social distance as a simple modification of the Euclidean norm, through the definition of a pair of indicator variables. Let X be any of the non-categorical variables (age, wealth, agricultural experience, non-agricultural sources of income) on which information is available. We then measure the distance between the respondent i and the match j by the following two variables:
8 Non-land wealth was estimated as the sum of the values of the following assets: foreign currency, cash in bank accounts, bonds, susu and esusu, livestock, crops, seeds, chemicals and farm equipment. The definition of individual wealth is made difficult by the number of missing answers in the value of some assets, specifically jewelry (244 missing answers), cash on hand (66) and clothes (45), even when we use the inventory of assets from round 1, when all respondents were interviewed. Non-farm equipment was enumerated only in rounds 9 and 15, while stocks for trade were only captured in round 2, and with a high number of missing values (360). We therefore omit these latter categories of assets from the non-land wealth estimates. 9 In the survey, an important number of respondents indicated their experience with some crops as "more than x years". We approximated such information by taking their experience with such crop to be "x years". We explore the effects of differences in formal education by defining a dummy variable designated "literacy" that accounts for the case when i is illiterate and j is literate. 10 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the set of explanatory variables.
[ As in the extant literature, we interpret our measures of social distance (that is, differences in gender, age, wealth and education), conditioned on differences in experience and importance of non-agricultural activities, as reflecting the cost of establishing a link. Hence, as a rule, we would expect negative coefficient estimates on these variables reflecting the fact that greater differences between people tend to discourage individuals from investing in establishing interpersonal links.
10 Illiterate is defined as never having attended school; literate is its complement.
Nonetheless, it is not obvious whether the variables associated with nonagricultural activities should encourage or discourage information links related to agricultural production and marketing. Can someone with a non-farming occupation (say, a teacher) be contacted in order to provide information on some problem related with agricultural production? In principle, one would expect the teacher's direct experience would not be especially helpful to a farmer. However, the teacher's capacity to access information that may not be available to a farmer could also be thought valuable a priori. A similar argument can be made about the value of farming experience, which may be valuable in dealing with commonplace problems, but which may not be so valuable in dealing with disequilibria, in which case, formal education (that we included, in this context, only as a variable that signals social position) could be more important.
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We analyze two further aspects of the structure of these information networks, the first suggested by the data itself and the second suggested by the literature on social networks. First, we explore the interlinkage between different networks and the effect of the existence of an information link between both individuals on some other matter on the probability of asking for advice on a different question. It is also apparent that although respondents rarely choose to contact a match for advice on only one of the three problems related to agricultural production (unhealthy crops, fertilizer application and planting technique), they are considerably more likely to make a link solely for advice on crop marketing. Networks interlinkage would appear to depend in part on the degree to which the explicit purposes of the links are closely related.
Second, we explore Granovetter's classic "strength of weak ties" hypothesis, that the most valuable connections people have are those that they exercise infrequently. The strength of weak ties hypothesis can be tested using respondents' answer to the question "In a normal month, how often do you talk with ___?"
where we take frequency of contact as the measure of the strength of the link. Figure 1 presents a smoothed frequency distribution of answers to this question, where several focal points plainly emerge, around 0 times per month, weekly, semi-weekly, and daily contact.
Figure 2 displays the smoothed frequency distribution of "yes" answers to each of the link questions conditional on frequency of contact. The frequency with which respondents indicate they would ask for advice from the random match seems to increase at a rapidly diminishing rate in frequency of contact. This suggests that the marginal effect of a weak tie -as signaled by very infrequent contact (e.g., weekly or less) with the match -on the likelihood of establishing a link is far higher than the marginal effect of increased contact with a strong tie.
[
Econometric estimation
To explain the decision to establish a link, we estimate the model
where l ijk * denotes i's propensity to establish a link with j in order to get access to information on problem k, X'is the matrix of explanatory variables described above, β is the corresponding parameter vector and u ij is a normally distributed error term. We cannot observe the latent variable l ijk * but can observe the dichotomous variable l ijk defined as
and that takes the value 1 when the answer to the k th question is "yes". We further assume
These assumptions imply a probit model estimated by clustering the observations on the identity of the respondent and taking the explanatory variables as exogenous.
Because we don't have information on all variables for all individuals/matches, we must drop approximately one-third of the observations. Nonetheless, a KolmogorovSmirnov test of the equality of the distributions for all dependent and independent variables does not support the rejection of the null hypothesis that the distribution of the variables for which we have complete information is from the same as the original one.
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We start by estimating the determinants of these networks, as revealed by the answers to each of the four prospective information link questions stated above. As shown in Table 1 , the decision to address one's match is shaped by previous knowledge of the match, where a negative answer to "Do you know ___?" determines a negative answer to the following questions. The apparently sequential choice process leads us to estimate the determinants of these networks using only the subsample of those who know their match (Maddala, 1983, p 124) .
But since the question of who knows whom is of interest in its own right, given the commonplace assumption of the village as a natural unit of analysis in much of the development literature, we start by addressing it.
a) Who knows whom? Table 4 , column A presents the results of the probit estimation for the dependent variable reflecting knowledge of the random match.
[TABLE 4]
The model performs remarkably well, correctly predicting individuals' knowledge of their random matches in more than 90 percent of cases. Individuals with greater wealth and net business revenue are more likely to know others, although individuals are 12 We repeated this test for subsequent exclusions of observations, namely when we only use the observations for which the respondent knows his match, and we could not reject the null hypothesis in any case. 13 Given the large size of these results tables, we skip the usual presentation of the marginal effects of explanatory variables. The coefficients measure the impact of changes in the explanatory variables upon the latent (unobservable) variable and thus offer meaningful inference on the sign of the effect upon the binary variable and allow for comparisons of the relative effect of different explanatory variables. Detailed results on the marginal effects of each explanatory variable are available from the authors on request.
significantly more likely to know people wealthier or earning less than themselves, as reflected by the coefficient estimates on the wealthier/poorer and net_rev_more/net_rev_less. A teacher will more likely be known but was no special advantage in knowing other people. Migrants are less likely to know nonmigrants and women are less likely to know men.
One of the striking things about these results is the asymmetric effect of variables such as gender, migrant status, wealth, net revenue and occupation. Table 4 , column B presents the probit estimates of the same equation (2) with social distance now measured more traditionally, as the absolute value of the difference, rather than using the modification we propose to accommodate potentially asymmetric costs and benefits between individuals. Although the number of explanatory variables that differ between the two models is relatively small, the results in column A tell a richer and more compelling story, as the interpretation of the coefficients associated with the wealth and net revenue variables make clear. We can test these alternative approaches more formally by defining
where X is the vector of differences as defined in equation (1), Z is the vector of absolute values of the differences and Y is the vector of variables that is common to both specifications. We test the adequacy of each model by checking their capacity to explain
over and above what is explained by the alternative specification: let l ijk 1 be the predicted value of l ijk * from equation (7) and let l ijk 2 have an analogous interpretation, from equation (8). After estimating the equation
we can test whether the set of variables X has any explanatory capacity through a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the vector B is statistically equal to zero. The same can be done with the model in equation (8) through estimation of the equation
and testing for the joint significance of D. If we can reject the null hypothesis that β is statistically equal to zero and cannot reject the null hypothesis that γ is statistically equal to zero, then our proposed approach to measuring social distance outperforms the standard method in these data. The two models will be statistically equivalent if we cannot reject either null hypothesis or if we can reject both.
When the dependent variable is interpersonal knowledge, there seems to be no statistically significant different between the two methods. The Wald statistics for the null hypotheses that D=0 and B=0 equal 2.40, which has a p-value of 0.966 against the X 2 8 distribution, and 17.43, which has a p-value of 0.625 against the X 2 20 distribution, respectively. While the interpretation of the asymmetric measures makes more intuitive sense and performs slightly better in predicting which matches a respondent will already know, those differences are not statistically significant. As we see in the next section, however, the asymmetric social distance measures significantly outperform the more standard, symmetric ones when we study the information links people choose to make. Table 5 summarizes the probit estimates of the decision of approach one's match in order to obtain information in response to the four questions above.
b) Asking for information
[ By contrast, each set of variables that measure the costs and benefits of a link in terms of differences between the respondent and his or her match are jointly statistically significant, usually at levels of significance below 1%. These two results -that the respondent's own attributes do not matter significantly to establishing a link, but that differences between the prospectively linked individuals matter a great deal -suggest that relative social position matters most.
Social distance between the respondent and match provides the strongest explanation for the choice to establish an information link, moreso than difference in agricultural experience, in non-agricultural activities or in occupations. Co-residence in the same household sharply increases the likelihood that one would ask the match.
Differences in migrant status matter and reasonably symmetrically, with migrants less likely to ask nonmigrants and vice versa, with point estimates that are not statistically significantly different from one another. Conditional on knowing each other -which, recall from Table 4 , is heavily impacted by wealth -people are more likely to ask questions of those who are less wealthy than themselves than of those of equal or greater wealth.
Gender differences matter a lot with respect to agricultural production matters, but not with respect to marketing. Perhaps more interesting, there appear to be strongly asymmetric effects of gender differences on individuals' incentives to establish information network links. Men are very reluctant to ask agricultural production questions of women, and women are less likely to ask such questions of each other, albeit statistically significantly so only with respect to plant health. But a woman is more likely to ask questions of a man than is another man.
Differences in experience with pineapple production seem to significantly affect respondents' search for information. Farmers appear significantly more likely to ask questions of matches with more experience than they have and less likely to ask questions of those with less experience. The differences are much larger in both magnitude and in statistical significance with respect to experience in pineapple, a new crop in the region, than in maize, a long-established staple crop. This sort of pattern is likewise intuitive and consistent with basic models of learning.
Differences in non-agricultural activities and in occupation likewise matter to farmers' propensity to ask questions of their random matches. Those who work more off-farm are considerably more likely to ask questions of those matches they know who spend less time off-farm and more time in agriculture than they do. Conversely, people are less likely to ask agricultural production questions of teachers or traders but far more likely to ask agricultural marketing questions of teachers. This suggests that those who are regarded as more detached from ordinary farming problems can nonetheless be seen as "bridges" towards solutions to nontraditional problems. This interpretation, which hints at the strength of weak ties hypothesis suggested by Granovetter (1973) , will be tested more formally, using information on the frequency of contact, in section 5.
As the preceding discussion implies, the asymmetric effects of social distance appear significant in understanding the endogenous formation of information networks in rural Ghana. We establish this more formally following the statistical approach enumerated earlier, based on estimating equations (7') and (8') and then testing the exclusionary restrictions on the unique components of each regression. 14 Table 6 displays the results of these tests. The asymmetric social distance measure dramatically outperforms the symmetric measure based on simple Euclidean distance in each of the three models related to agricultural production information. Although the asymmetric treatment performs modestly better with respect to agricultural marketing information as well, there is no statistically significant difference between the two social distance measures with respect to that dependent variable.
[ The differences in determinants of network linkages between information related to agricultural production and to agricultural marketing (Tables 3, 6 and 7) raise the question of the degree to which information networks interlink. Are people more likely to ask a question of a randomly matched individual the more likely they are to ask a different question of that same individual? Or do people target questions differentially at distinct individuals, building different networks with relatively limited interconnectedness? We turn now to explore this question.
Interlinked networks
As mentioned above, the similarities between the three different agricultural productionrelated information networks are quite striking. We test for their interlinkage by reestimating the above models, now also including as explanatory variables the fitted values of the probability of establishing a link in the remaining models. That is, we estimate the system of equations
l ijk * = l ij-k~µ + X' β* + u 1 u 1 ~ N(0,1)
where l ij-k * is i's propensity to address j in order to get information to solve any of the problems other than the k th problem, while l ij-k~ is defined as
The estimated coefficients on the fitted l ij-k regressor are presented in Table 7 , together with the value of the Wald statistic of the test of the joint null hypothesis that all other variables (those enumerated in Table 5 ) equal zero.
[ We can define these networks as interlinked when our estimates from equation (10) permit us to reject the hypothesis that the µ parameter relating l ijk * to l ij-k * equals zero while at the same time failing to reject the null hypothesis that β * = 0, i.e., that other network linkages fully explain an individual's likelihood of establishing an information link to a randomly matched person.
Given this definition, we can only conclude that the decision to ask for advice on fertilizer application is not interlinked with other decisions to establish an information network. As for the other prospective information topics, we either cannot reject the null hypothesis that the other network linkages do not add to our understanding of links regarding questions of unhealthy crops or planting technique or we can reject the null hypothesis that once one controls for the other network links, the remaining covariates have no statistically significant relation to the likelihood of asking about agricultural marketing.
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Nonetheless, since there is no reason to expect that differences in identity would impose costs of establishing a link that would differ with the problem about which a respondent might inquire of his or her match, this result strikes us as further evidence of the asymmetric benefits of establishing an information link in one's network, with the asymmetry in this case arising from relatively modest differences in the nature of the information sought.
Strength of ties
The evidence in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 5 raises the intriguing possibility that
Granovetter's classic "strength of weak ties" hypothesis might find support in these data.
In formulating our hypothesis, we follow the original intuition of the author (Granovetter, 1973) : "A natural a priori idea is that those with whom one has strong ties are more motivated to help with job information. Opposed to this greater motivation are the structural arguments I have been making: those to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to move in circles different from our own and will thus have access to information different from that which we receive".
Of course, it is not exactly clear how one ought to measure the strength of a tie.
In the original exposition of this hypothesis, Granovetter (1973) writes that "most intuitive notions of the "strength" of an interpersonal tie should be satisfied by the following definition: the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie." In an early review of studies that tried to test this hypothesis, Granovetter (1982) identifies two major ways of operationalizing the concept of "strength of tie": (i) frequency of contact, as we use here and as did Granovetter (1973) , and (ii) the assumption that ties with different people (e.g., kin, friends, colleagues and acquaintances) had inherently different strength, something that is not directly measurable in these data.
Instead of assuming that the probability of establishing a link is a monotonically decreasing function of frequency of contact, we posit that such relation may be nonlinear. As is plain from Table 1 , people need to already know someone in order for them to feel comfortable approaching them for information or advice. So there is plainly a sharp increase in the likelihood of establishing a link as one makes initial contact. The salient question is how much additional contact increases people's propensity to establish informational links. Up to some point, more frequent contact may permit better evaluation of the costs and benefits of the link (e.g., the likely accuracy of the information obtained and the motivation level of the match to respond to a request for assistance), after which point high frequency interaction may signal that little new or relevant information can be transmitted by the potential contact.
In order to test the "strength of weak ties" hypothesis we therefore estimate the following system of equations:
l ijk * = α z + λ z 2 + X' β + u ij u ij ~ N(0, 1) (15) where z ij is frequency of contact between i and j, X is the same vector of explanatory variables as before, and z and z 2 are, respectively, the predicted value of frequency of talk and its square, obtained by estimating equation (14).
16
In order to obtain the fitted values of frequency of talk, we regressed this variable on the same variables as in the previous models, but using only a subsample of the original data. In particular we excluded those observations with a abnormally high number of "average number of talks in a normal month". 17 The results are presented in Table 8 .
[ As one would expect, the frequency with which the respondent and his or her random match speak is sharply increasing if they reside in the same household. Men speak to each other more frequently than do women with either men or women. Teachers and traders speak with people more frequently than do people in other occupations. And, in general, the frequency of contact decreases with social distance along any of several dimensions: wealth, income, occupation, etc. Table 9 summarizes the coefficient estimates associated with the variables z and z 2 . These estimates indicate precisely the hypothesized strong concave relation between frequency of contact and likelihood of establishing a link. The last row in Table 9 presents the estimated number of talks per month that maximizes the probability of contacting one's match. The estimated marginal effect is shown in Figure 3 for the case of asking about fertilizer application. The marginal effects for the other three questions look very similar.
[ In the case of traditional agricultural production questions (concerning planting techniques and plant health), about which farmers have less to learn, the frequency of contact that maximizes the likelihood that someone asks a question of a match is almost 25% larger than in those cases where new or more extraordinary information is sought d (regarding fertilizer application and finding a buyer). This is consistent with the sociological observation that heterophilous relations -contacts with people less like oneself, which occur less frequently -are especially valuable in addressing novel situations. Farmers trade off social proximity for access to new information as most appropriate to the question at hand. In all cases, however, the greatest marginal effect on the likelihood of making the information network link occurs at very low frequency of contact. Weak ties indeed seem to have strong effects.
Conclusions
The structure of one's social networks has been increasingly recognized as a crucial determinant of access to information, credit and, more generally, influence. Although social networks' role in shaping decisions and outcomes seems important, quantification of this effect has proved relatively elusive, not least of which because analysts have typically been unable to control adequately for the obvious endogeneity of networks.
This paper argues for the need to treat social networks as endogenous and for the importance of recognizing the asymmetries that underlie the concept of social distance as it relates to the establishment of information network linkages. We propose and test a new measure of social distance that accommodates possible asymmetries in social distance and find that, for most of the problems analyzed in this paper, this new measure outperforms the Euclidean norm most commonly used in the extant literature.
Using this improved measure of social distance, we stress the need to consider explicitly the cost-benefit calculus in which agents engage when deciding whether or not to link to another individual. Networks are not exogenously determined on the basis of inherited identity; they are a direct product of individual choice, albeit choice that is conditioned by social distance that is predetermined (e.g., with respect to occupation) or exogenous (e.g., with respect to gender). Our results show that social distance plays a major role indeed in shaping network structure, but that other factors related to the inherent costs and benefits of linkage matter significantly as well.
Reinforcing this point, we find that in spite of the evident similarities in the structure of the four networks we study and although social distance is exactly the same between each respondent and his or her random matches in each prospective network, there are statistically and economically significant differences between these networks.
The costs of establishing a link with respect to social distance should be the same whatever the problem, yet the benefits will vary across the question at hand. Thus, for example, people more actively seek out particular types of individuals -teachers, traders, those with whom they have less frequent contact -when faced with nontraditional questions than with problems with which they have much prior experience themselves.
We interpret these differences as evidence that cross-sectional variation in the benefits of links affect agents' behavior in constructing and maintaining information networks. This point is further reinforced by our empirical corroboration of the sociological "strength of weak ties" hypothesis, that there exists inverted-U effect of frequency of contact upon the decision to form a network link, with the greatest marginal effects occurring at the lowest frequencies of interpersonal contact. In both specifications, the variables "Same_hh" and "Both_teacher" predict success perfectly when equal to 1; these variables were dropped and 25 observations were not used. Also, the variables "trad_ntrad", "farmer" and "teacher" were dropped due to collinearity. In the specification presented in column A, "male" is dropped due to collinearity. The variables "both_migrant" and "both_teacher" predict failure perfectly, when equal to 1 -these variables were dropped and 5 observations were not used. The variables "both_trader", "teacher_nteacher" and "farmer" were dropped due to collinearity. For the same reason the variables that express differences in experience in cassava were dropped. Variables included in the regression but not reported in this table are: constant, village dummies, older, younger, literacy, cocoa_more, cocoa_less, yam_more, yam_less, both_farmer, farm_nfarm, nfarm_farm, pineapple, cocoa, cassava, net_rev, wage and teacher. 2) Double indicator prob>X 2 = 0.00 prob>X 2 = 0.00 prob>X 2 = 0.00 prob>X 2 = 0.99 Conclusion reject 1) reject 1) reject 1) 1) and 2) are equivalent Prob > F = 0.0000 The variables "farmer", "trad_ntrad" and "both_teacher" were dropped due to collinearity. Included in the regression but omitted from this table: "wage_more", "wage_less", "net_rev_more", "net_rev_less", "wage", time_job", "net_rev","time_bus", village dummies and constant. 
